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Introduction
Enforcement of contracts and property rights lie at the heart of economic and human developments. During the past decade, our understanding of the historical evolution of various institutional mechanisms to cope with the issues has been greatly enhanced in particular by the law and finance literature initiated by La Porta et al. (1998) . While the scope has been broadened to include growth at country, industry and firm levels, the human development dimension has been sidelined in the so-called legal origins debate that centres on the relative merits of common-law versus civil-law and on the impact these two different legal regimes exert on financial structures, corporate governance and industrial organization. Our paper cuts adrift this mainstream approach by integrating both overall economic and human components in the law-growth nexus. Given the relative importance of African countries as transplant colonies (neo-colonies) of Western legal traditions, the dire human and economic conditions existing there and the on-going debate on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a focus on the continent could lead to findings with very appealing policy implications. We also aim to broaden the scope of our analysis by integrating dummies that lay emphasis on the positions of subSaharan and North African countries which have been largely neglected in the "legal origins debate".
Hitherto, most empirical work on the law-growth nexus has been of global appeal and based on very limited data. In the aftermath of the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (hence LLSV, 1998) 2 , the need to collect data that could proxy law standards became a subject to concern in World Bank Development Indicators. Today to the best of our knowledge and as far as we have perused, the absence of a study that reflects the African continent in the light of findings from pioneering studies (and resulting hypotheses) is deserving of examination. As we must have emphasized above, the African continent is an ideal premise for assessing the outcomes of first works because, it is lagging behind in terms of growth and human development on the one hand, on the other it was (is) subject to colonialism (neocolonialism) and thus a fertile ground to investigate what role colonial law legacies have (are) played (playing) in overall economic and human developments. Literature on the law-finance (growth) nexus can be classified into the following strands.
The first strand includes a growing body of work which suggests that cross-country differences in legal origin account for cross-country differences in financial development and growth. LLSV (1998) pioneered this strand and since then many authors have taken from them in asserting the edge English common-law countries have over their French civil-law counterparts in prospects of financial development. Emphasis has been made on the fact that, English common-law traditions (French civil-law traditions) furnish the strongest (weakest) legal protection to shareholders and creditors (LLSV, 1998 (LLSV, , 2000 . This scale has been tipped to other aspects of management and government: more informative accounting standards (LLSV,1998), better institutions with less corrupt governments (LLSV,1999) as well as more efficient courts (Djankow et al.,2003) . It is worth noting that, this strand has been largely focused on understanding 'if ' legal-origins matter in financial development. The issue of 'why' legalorigins matter remained elusive until Beck et al. (2003) assessed some theories to address the concern.
In the second strand of the literature Beck et al. (2003) shed some lights on the issues of 'why' legal origins matter in finance by empirically assessing two law channel-based theories. The political channel lays emphasis on how legal traditions differ in the priority they attribute to the rights of individual-investors vis-à-vis the state. It follows that countries that champion investors' rights should have greater prospects for financial development. The adaptability channel postulates that legal traditions differ in their capacity to adjust and adapt to changing business circumstances. This implies countries in which legal systems provide for adjustments with respect to changing and evolving circumstances should have higher prospects for financial development. Therefore, this strand solves the "why" puzzle in asserting that legal origin matters in financial development because traditionally, legal origins differ in their ability to adjust and adapt efficiently to changing and evolving economic situations.
In the third strand, we find literature championing the nexus that financial development greatly contributes to a country's overall economic growth (McKinnon, 1973) . This optimism has been shared and empirically supported at the country level (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Allen et al., 2005) , as well as at industry and firm levels (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
2 Macro-economic law quality data on the African continent was unavailable before the pioneering work of LLSV (1998). The first working paper pertaining to the study was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 1996. Data on the quality of regulation and the rule of law for the African continent saw the light of day that same year.
The fourth strand looks at the law-finance (growth) relationship. It provides evidence for links among law, finance and economic growth at firm, industry and country levels (DemirgucKunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2002) .
The fifth strand that is largely focused on African countries is pioneered by the Mundell (1972) conjecture, which theorized that Anglophone countries shaped by British activism and openness (to experiment) would naturally be rewarded by higher levels of financial development than their francophone neighbors (influenced by French reliance on monetary rules and automaticity) 3 . Recent literature on the African continent has either wholly (Agbor, 2011) or partially (Asongu, 2011ab) confirmed the edge English common-law countries have in growth and finance prospects respectively 4 . Historically it should be noted that the partition of Africa into British and French spheres in the 19 th century resulted in the implementation of two dissimilar colonial policies 5 .The contribution of the present paper to the literature differs from those of Agbor (2011) and Asongu (2011a) by: (1) investigating the law-growth nexus on the African continent and using a North African (sub-Saharan African) dummy to distinguish the effects of North African (sub-Saharan African) countries; (2) using law indicators to assess the relationship between legal origin and development (economic and human) 6 ; (3) and employing much novel data 7 for more focused and updated policy implications 8 . The rest of the paper is partitioned in the following manner. Section 2 discusses economic growth and human development while Section 3 looks at various channels in the lawgrowth theory. Data sources and methodology are revealed and discussed respectively in Section 4. Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 5. We conclude with Section 6.
Economic growth and human development 2.1 Economic growth
We define economic growth as the increasing capacity of the economy to meet up with the wants of members of societies that constitute it. It can be appreciated either at macro or 3 (Mundell, 1972; pp. 42-43) . 4 While Agbor (2011) investigates how legal-origin affects economic performance, Asongu (2011a) proposes four theories in assessing why legal-origin matters in growth and welfare. Both studies are focused on the sub-Saharan part of Africa. 5 The British and French implemented two different colonial policies. While the French imposed a highly centralized bureaucratic system that clearly underlined empire-building, the British on their part administered pragmatic, flexible and decentralized policies. Economic ambitions dominated British colonial activities who sought to transform their colonies into commercially viable trading countries (partners) through the indirect-rule: producing raw material for their industries and consuming British manufactures. The French on their part propagated imperial ambitions through a policy of assimilation. 6 While Agbor (2011) has used channels of education and trade to investigate how colonial origin affects the economic performance of sub-Saharan African countries, Asongu (2011a) has employed financial channels in explaining why colonial legacy matters in economic growth and welfare. In this study we use law channels. 7 The Inequality adjusted Human Development Index we use to proxy human developed was first introduced in the 2010 Human Development Report. Beyond this fact, data on regulation quality and rule of law from African Development Indicators of the World Bank have been largely unexplored due to their limited time series properties (data collection began only in 1996). 8 micro-economic levels. In the context of this paper we define macro and micro levels by GDP and GDP per capita growth respectively.
Human development
Human development is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon. We hereby refer to the economic sense of the term where-by some crucial aspects of the proper livelihood of citizens in a country are taken into account. Examples of aspects of this terminology that fall within the framework of our paper are: life expectancy, literacy, education, standards of living…etc. We equally intend to lay emphasis on the politico-economic aspect of the term because it may also be used to distinguish whether a country is developed or not as a result of the impact of its economic policies on the quality of life of its citizens. Such politico-economic measures include regulatory quality and the rule of law which we address below.
Law channels and development theory 3.1 Regulation quality
For this channel, we postulate that a legal system that enables independent bodies to set-up rules, oversee their application and sanction those who fail to respect them is more likely to foster favorable conditions for economic growth and human development. Aspects of regulation quality like unfair competitive practices, price controls, discriminatory tariffs, discriminatory taxes, excessive protections, burden of administrative regulations, distortional tax system, import barrier, cost of tariffs as obstacle to growth, degree of competition in local market, ease of starting a company, laxity of anti-monopoly policy, how ineffective environmental regulations hurt competitiveness, foreign investment nature, banking and Finance, administered prices and market prices, ease of market entry for new firms…etc, tend to affect growth in economic and human terms in one way or the other. If the power of the government in business activities is largely limited by the presence of independent bodies that ensure regulation quality, then the likelihood of development is greater. While most French civillaw countries are characterized by little decentralization, appointment of judges and governors by the central government…etc, English common-law countries traditionally have regulatory organs that are not appointed by government and therefore not subject to any form of allegiance to the power that be in their commitment to regulatory quality. It follows that, the independence of regulatory organs in English common-law countries naturally provides them with an edge in development over French civil-law countries.
Rule of law
This channel lays emphasis on the fact that, legal traditions differ in their focus on law vis-à-vas the rights of the state and private property. Therefore, legal systems that champion private property ownership and intellectual property rights have the tendency to create favorable conditions for economic and human developments. Conversely, legal systems that put more emphasis on the power of the state to the detriment of private property rights create conditions that deter development at both overall economic and human levels. A logical result is that, countries with common-law tradition provide better development conditions than those with civillaw tradition. These assertions are in line with the literature (LLSV, 1998; Beck et al., 2003).
Data and Methodology 4.1 Data
We examine a sample of 38 African countries with British, French and Portuguese legal origins (see Appendices 1 and 2). Due to the limited nature of data on human development, we are obliged to divide the dataset into two categories: a primary dataset of 38 countries (Panel A of Appendix 1) and a secondary dataset (Panel B of Appendix 1) of 28 countries. Countries with Portuguese legal origin are absent in the second dataset. We use the first dataset to account for the effects of legal tradition on growth and the second for the effects of legal origin on human development. All variables are taken from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB). Owing the limited span of data on regulation quality and rule-of-law, both datasets span from 1996 to 2008. We also add the legal origins of countries to the dataset in order to account for endogeneity. As pointed-out by Beck et al. (2003) from Berkowitz et al. (2002) , it is crucial to distinguish between legal origin countries (France, United Kingdom, the U.S.A, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) which formed the legal traditions from countries in which the legal legacies were transplanted. However this fact doesn't pose any concern to this paper because legal origins are primarily used as instruments. Data collected could be classified in the following categories.
Law indicators a) Regulatory Quality
With respect to the World Bank, the quality of regulation captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and foster private sector development. The concept is appreciated by both representative 9 and non-representative 10 sources. This indicator is measured in percentile rank from 0 to 100.
b) Rule of Law
This indicator measures perceptions of the extent to which economic agents have confidence in and abide by rules of society, particularly on the quality of property rights, the courts, contract enforcement, the police, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The measurement is in percentile rank from 0 to 100 from a plethora of criteria from representative 11 and non-representative 12 sources.
What is important to note here is that, these two law-measures encompass the four indicators considered by Beck et al. (2003) in theorizing the political and adaptability channels of law. Our indicators even go further than theirs as they are a summary of a plethora of measures mentioned on the footnotes pertaining to their definitions and elucidations above.
Growth and human development variables
While growth at overall economic and human levels are measured by GDP growth and GDP per capita growth respectively, human development is appreciated by the Inequality adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic used by the World Bank to rank countries by levels of human development. It is a comparative measure of life-expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living worldwide. The 2010 Human Development Report was the first to adjust the HDI (income, education and life expectancy) with inequality factors. Therefore, this work has the added appeal of using a recently unexplored indicator of human development.
Instrumental variables
We assess legal origin dummies for the English, French and Portuguese colonial legacies. In order to ameliorate our contribution to the literature, we add dummies for subSaharan Africa (SSA), and North Africa. These dummies are used as instruments. But for the SSAfrican dummy which reflects about 85 % (dataset without IHDI) and 80 % (dataset with IHDI) of the French legal origin dummy, all other dummies reflect quite distinct information or variability (see Appendix 2). lowest levels of inflation. Preliminary assessment of differences in levels of trade and inflation is consistent with the law-finance (growth) theory. English countries manifest higher levels of trade because they traditionally have legal systems that provide for competition and openness (in trade and capital). This is in accordance with Agbor (2011) . On the other hand, countries with French legal tendencies averagely have the lowest levels of inflation because the French colonial legacy is focused on lowering levels of inflation since former French colonies have sacrificed financial independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972) . 
Methodology 4.2.1 Estimation method
In accordance with Beck et al. (2003) and recent African legal origin literature (Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011ab) we employ a Two-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS) methodology with dummies of legal origins as instrumental variables. This estimation technique has the particular advantage of looking at the issue of endogeneity. Thus, the instrumental variable estimator can avoid the bias that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates suffer-from when explanatory variables in a regression are correlated with the disturbance term. More so, the context out paper (use of legal origin as instruments) requires an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation method. In the approach, we shall adopt the following steps: -provide justification for the use of a TSLS approach over an OLS estimation technique through the Hausman-test for endogeneity; -show that instrumental variables (legal origins) explain the endogenous components of explaining variables (law channels), conditional on other covariates; -check the validity of the instruments via an Over-identifying restriction (OIR) test.
Our methodology includes the following models:
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
In all three equations, X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in some of the second stage regressions. For the first/second and third equations, v and u, respectively represent the error terms. Instrumental variables are the five legal origin dummies. 'Development' encompasses GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and human development. Frenchssa is the dummy for French SSA.
Choice of endogenous regressors for control at the second-stage of the TSLS
The quality of control covariates at the second stage of the TSLS method is very crucial. These covariates for control must be justified by an underlying theory in which instruments are exogenous to them. In this study, we adopt Trade and Inflation as endogenous variables of control because they are backed by the underlying law-growth theory and can be explained by the instruments. For instance, the law-growth theory historically and empirically demonstrates that trade in English common-law countries will be greater than in French civil-law countries because traditionally, the former countries are more opened(in trade and capital) and competitive (Agbor, 2011) . On the other hand, countries with French legal tendencies should have the lowest levels of inflation because french colonial legacy has focused on sacrificing financial independence and monetary experience for exchange stability (Mundell, 1972) . A close comparative scrutiny of Tables 1 and 2 justify the choice of these variables (Trade and Inflation) 13 .
Cross-country regressions
This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to assess the importance of legal origin in explaining cross-country variance in economic growth and human development, the ability of legal origin to explain cross-country differences in regulation quality and rule of law indicators, and the ability of the exogenous components of the law channels to account for cross-country differences in economic growth and human development.
Legal origins and development
In Table 3 , we regress our growth and human development indicators on the legal origin dummies and also test for their joint significance. Results in Panel A show that, distinguishing countries by legal origin helps explain cross-country differences in growth and human development. Even after controlling for trade, inflation and government expenditure, the legal origin dummies enter jointly significant in all regressions at the 1% significance level. Growth in GDP and GDP per capita is highest in countries with Portuguese civil-law origin, followed by English common-law countries, then North-African countries and lastly by Frenchspeaking countries of SSA. For effects on human development, the same order is respected but with Portuguese countries absent (as the regressions are based on the second data set). 13 Inflation is lowest in French countries and Trade significantly higher in English countries with respect to their French counterparts. *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. Frenchssa: French sub-Saharan Africa. Student t-statistics are presented in brackets. Table 4 below assesses whether legal origin explains cross-country differences in the law indicators which are characterized by regulation quality and rule of law channels. We regress the proxies for law indicators on the legal origin dummy variables. We report the F-test of whether legal origin dummy variables taken together explain significantly cross-country variations in the rule of law and regulation quality. Clearly legal origin helps explain cross-country differences in the law indicators as the F-test of the joint significance of these dummies indicate that legal origin is significant at the 1% level. Even after controlling for population growth, trade, inflation and final government expenditure, results are still appealing (Panel B) . On average, British common-law countries dominate in both indicators while French civil-law countries from SSA are least. These findings are consistent with the law-growth theory elucidated above. Table 5 addresses the issues of: (1) whether the exogenous components of the rule of law and regulation quality indicators explain growth and development and (2) whether legal origin explains growth and development through some other mechanisms than law channels. To make these assessments, we use TSLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. So at this stage we add equation (3) to the estimations. When combining either equations (1) and (3) or equations (2) and (3), two pairs of four legal origin dummies are used as instrumental variables (we do not use French and SSA-French at the same time). Even when all five instruments are used in a single regression, the TSLS results do not change significantly. What we seek to address by this robustness check is the evident correlation between French countries and French-SSAfrican countries 14 . At first glance, our results justify the use of the TSLS estimation method as the null hypothesis of the Hausman-test is rejected in all regressions. This implies OLS estimates are not consistent due of the presence of endogeneity. Secondly we check the validity of our instruments through the OIR-test and find that all instruments are valid. Therefore, the instruments do suffer from the same problem (correlation with the disturbance term) as the endogenous regressors in the equation of interest (equation 3).
Legal origins and law channels

Examination of law channels using a TSLS Instrumental Variable procedure
The first issue of whether the exogenous components of the rule of law and regulation quality explain economic growth and human development can be appreciated from the significance of their corresponding estimated coefficients. On the second concern of knowing if legal origin explains growth and development through some other mechanisms than law channels, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR-test in all regressions suggests that legal origins explain economic growth and human development through law channels(when other determinants of growth and development are controlled for). It is also worth noting that regulatory quality has a higher impact on the endogenous variables than the rule of law. 14 To further investigate if evidence of correlation between the SSAfrican and French dummies have some bearing on the outcome of our regressions, for each model we carry-out three different regressions: the first and second in which we independently verify the validity of the French and SSAfrican dummies as instruments and the third, in which we use both of them simultaneously. We do not find any substantial difference in the results. The use of the five dummies provides degrees of freedom sufficient for the OIR-test for instrument validity. 
Conclusion
While past works have assessed how legal origin explains financial development, this paper has examined the mechanisms by which traditional legal legacies handed down to colonies by former colonial powers affect economic growth. We have used a novel indicator first introduced in 2010 to measure the impact of legal channels on inequality adjusted human development. Our results show that, the quality of regulation and rule of law are exogenous to economic growth and human development, with the effect of the former (quality of regulation) higher than that of the latter. Findings also reveal that, legal origin does not explain economic growth and human development through some other mechanisms beside law channels when other potential exogenous determinants of economic growth and human development (consistent with the law-growth theory and empirically valid) are controlled for.
Our results support the current consensus (LLSV., 1998; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011) that English common-law countries provide for better legal systems that improve conditions for economic growth and human development than French civil-law countries. Portuguese civil-law countries lie between the French-speaking and North African countries, while French sub-Saharan Africa is slightly below the average of Francophone Africa. As a policy implication, results support the benefits of the rule of law and quality of regulation as channels to economic growth and human development. 
